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Abstract
We conduct a large scale randomized field experiment to study whether providing recipients
– 42,454 Chinese households in a rural area – with information on the costs of a real decision
they make can help to improve the quality of their choices. The decisions are of high financial
impact, as the objects of deliberation – air conditioners – have upfront prices exceeding
the average monthly salary of a household. Besides providing nominal cost information,
we conduct two additional treatments, where we either present the same information by
making the real opportunity costs salient, or by administering the information via a quiz.
The former aims at facilitating the comparison of effective costs, while the latter aims at
enhancing attention and cognitive involvement. We find that providing cost information
substantially affects the choices made, and reduces the decision mistakes, in particular in
the two additional treatments.
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ment, Energy Efficiency
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1 Introduction
In most economic decisions, an adequate cost-benefit analysis plays a central role for making
the right choices. Conducting such an analysis requires sufficient factual information about the
choice alternatives, alongside with cognitive efforts to evaluate this information relative to the
own needs. Various studies have shown that people reach suboptimal decisions because they fail
to collect all relevant information, or because they fail to adequately process the available infor-
mation in an economically viable manner (see, e.g., Hossain and Morgan, 2006; Chetty et al.,
2009; Lacetera et al., 2012; Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015; Bhargava
et al., 2017; Kaufmann et al., 2018). For example, calculating the opportunity costs associated
with a durable good, such as a lightbulb, requires to anticipate the energy savings over the pro-
jected life span, which means accounting for electricity costs, usage pattern or lifetime relative
to differences in the upfront prices between various devices.
In this article, we report a field study that we conducted to assess whether providing qualified
information, aimed at helping people in evaluating the cost information provided by the market
about durable goods, can improve the quality of choices. Our study exploits a recent policy
intervention in rural China. The background is summarized as follows. In view of the problems
associated with air pollution, the Chinese government has required that coal-burning stoves
for household heating purpose need to be replaced by an electricity-based technology, such as
air-conditioners (AC’s), which can be used for cooling and heating purposes. These products
were offered by various suppliers in the market, and lump-sum subsidized by the government
to ease the financial burden imposed on less well situated households.
The alternatives in the market differ in their upfront prices and usage costs, e.g., due to
different levels of energy efficiency. Therefore, depending on electricity consumption, different
alternatives may be optimal for different households. Specifically, AC’s were available in two
levels of energy efficiency across different brands. AC’s with the higher efficiency level consume
less energy per hour, but also come at a higher upfront price. Therefore, evaluating which effi-
ciency level is optimal for a household requires a careful deliberation about the anticipated usage.
Our study is earmarked by the fact that the purchase of an AC imposes a severe impact on most
households’ annual budgets: already the upfront prices of the products in the market exceed
the average monthly salary in the study population, even after deducting the subsidy. If the
objects at stake involve only a small fraction of the household’s budget, it seems reasonable that
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comparative cost evaluations may be prone to mistakes, reflecting that people do not engage
in a comprehensive deliberation, as the possible decision mistake seem not to be of substantial
harm. By contrast, one could think that the level of attention or cognitive effort is augmented in
such circumstances compared to decisions between products in low-involvement categories.1 In
such a case, interventions aimed at improving the evaluation of the available information seem
to become redundant, as the market already provides enough incentives for people to “think
things through”. Our field study provides a test of this conjecture.
We used a randomized control trial to study whether the provision of qualified information
regarding the projected usage costs affects the purchase decisions made by the households, and
in particular also helps them improving their choices. Our study involves four conditions - a base
condition and three treatment conditions. Villages were randomly assigned to one condition.
In the control condition, the residents of the villages received no information other than what
was made available by the market suppliers. In the three treatment conditions, we provided
villagers with factual information about the AC usage costs. This information was aimed
at facilitating the cost comparisons between the two different levels of energy efficiency. This
information consisted of paradigmatic calculations, that exemplify the average opportunity costs
of acquiring a less efficient AC for various projected activity periods. As such, our information
interventions did not convey new facts – all the information we used in the calculations were
available in the market.
We provided this information to villagers in three slightly different ways. In the “Pure
Information” treatment, we simply stated the opportunity costs at face value in nominal terms.
The two other treatments were inspired by different underpinnings, but both were aimed at
improving the quality of the required deliberations about the effective costs.
Most villagers in our study are endowed with limited education – about 80 % of the household-
ers did not go to high school, and more than one third did not go to middle school. One concern
we had is that villagers may have problems transferring the opportunity cost calculations we
provide in “Pure Information” to their decision situation, given the educational situation and
the fact that the information features nominal usage costs expressed in large and fairly abstract
numbers.2 Therefore, in the “Milk” treatment we simply expressed the opportunity costs in
units of an economic good they were highly familiar with from everyday life: Milk.
1For example, theories of optimal information acquisition, such as rational inattention or optimal consumer
search, commonly predict a higher effort to scrutinize if the stakes at decision are high, making decision errors
less likely to occur, ceteris paribus, compared to situations with low stakes.
2Similar problems have been observed in other contexts (Frederick et al., 2009).
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Another concern we had is that villagers may be discouraged by the information load im-
posed by the campaigning firms, and fail to use sufficient cognitive efforts and attention for
adequately processing the cost information in response, despite the high stakes of the decisions.
Our third treatment therefore seeks to lure the households into the necessary deliberations in a
playful manner. Various psychological studies have indicated that people adopt their intended
behavior if they previously become more involved into the subject (Gollwitzer and Sheeran,
2006; Hettema et al., 2005; Carrera et al., 2018). Inspired by this literature, we presented the
factual cost information as a quiz to the households in the “Involvement” treatment. The idea
is that a quiz with a reward for correct answers may induce people to engage in the required
cost calculations, which itself raises interest and familiarity with the matter more than if the
same information is just passively displayed to them.
The data of our field experiment shows that the information treatments significantly affected
the purchase behavior. In particular, the more energy-efficient AC is less and the less efficient
AC more often chosen in treated villages relative to control villages. We assess whether these
changes are likely to reflect improvements in the individual household’s welfare by various
measures.
First, we use the data of electricity consumption in control villages and an ex-post survey we
conducted to infer threshold levels, in terms of AC activity hours or energy consumption, below
which the more efficient AC constitutes a dominated option. We find that a clear majority of
households indeed have an activity pattern below these thresholds, supporting that the observed
shift in purchases improves household welfare, at least on average.
Second, we identify a subsample of households, across treatment and control villages, for
which the purchase of the more efficient AC most likely constitutes a decision mistake, as this
type of AC is dominated by the less efficient AC in terms of total expenditures. The data
confirms that the likelihood of such decision mistakes is significantly reduced under our infor-
mation treatments, which again supports that the observed changes have improved household
welfare. In addition, we find that this effect is driven by our behavioral treatment variations,
which suggests a powerful role for such interventions to improve the quality of choices.
The remainder is organized as follows. We discuss the relevant literature in Section 2. Section
3 describes the design of the field experiment and derives our main hypotheses. In Section 4
we explain the implementation of the field experiment in detail, and Section 5 presents the
empirical results; Section 6 concludes.
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2 Related Literature
There is a sizable literature on the effects of providing lifetime energy costs on consumers’
purchases of durable goods, such as washing machines (Deutsch, 2010b), televisions (Heinzle,
2012), freezers and tumblers (Kallbekken et al., 2013; Stadelmann and Schubert, 2018), water
heaters (Newell and Siikamäki, 2014; Allcott and Sweeney, 2017), cooling appliances (Deutsch,
2010a; Davis and Metcalf, 2016), lighting (Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015), or refrigerators (Houde,
2018).3 We contribute to this literature in at least four ways: 1) We conduct a pure field study
with real purchase decisions rather than a laboratory experiment; 2) The decisions that need
to be made are of high stakes; 3) We consider two behaviorally motivated treatment variations
of providing the same factual information to households; 4) Our data allows to access whether
the decisions made are improved, rather than just altered, due to the information provided. In
the following, we outline each of these aspects.
First, given that most existing papers on the topic are laboratory studies not based on actual
purchase decisions, we regard it as important to empirically study information effects in case of
non-artificial decisions that involve real purchases. We use a randomized control trial approach
to approximate the degree of control that is a characteristic of laboratory studies, allowing for
a causal interpretation of the empirical findings.
Second, the decision tasks in the existing literature we are aware of mostly deal with low-
involvement products, where the expenses involve a rather negligible portion of a household’s
budget. By contrast, the decisions in our study impose very high stakes, as the purchase, e.g.,
of an AC exceeds the average monthly salary available to the villagers. We think of this aspect
as noteworthy, because it is intuitively conceivable that people do not engage in information-
seeking and mental deliberation if the choice alternatives, and the possible decision mistakes,
are small relative to the overall available budget. Such a behavior could change if the alterna-
tives under consideration are expensive.4 At the very least, it seems fair to challenge whether
one can extrapolate previous findings to the case of high stakes.
Third, we consider two refinements to providing merely factual information about the prospec-
3Several papers examine the effects of information provision on purchase decisions in contexts other than
energy-using durables, see, e.g., Dranove and Jin (2010) or Allcott and Sweeney (2017).
4It is a common result in models of optimal information acquisition that information-seeking increases, ceteris
paribus, if the corresponding stakes are higher.
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tive opportunity costs of the alternatives in the market. In parts, this is motivated by the fact
that most households in our study lack high-school education, and we conjecture that the sheer
provision of numerical cost information may not be amenable for everyone. The two treatment
variations we conduct are meant to address this concern, where we kept the factual information
ultimately provided to households constant.
In the first variation, we phrased the cost information in terms of (forgone) milk consump-
tion, which is a real commodity known to the villagers from everyday life. This approach is
largely motivated by research in social psychology and economics, which has shown that people
commonly neglected opportunity costs and focus on information that is salient at the point of
making purchase decisions (Thaler, 1980; Frederick et al., 2009).5 Read et al. (2017) find that
when highlighting the opportunity costs of choosing smaller and sooner options, people become
more patient, or Persson and Tinghög (2020) report on substantial opportunity cost neglect in
a survey experiment about public policy.
The second variation is based on the premise that people may fail to pay sufficient attention
to complex decision tasks.6 A recent literature demonstrates that enhancing cognitive involve-
ment may increase attention and help people to take desirable actions (Gollwitzer and Sheeran,
2006; Hettema et al., 2005; Carrera et al., 2018). For example, Nickerson and Rogers (2010)
show in a field experiment that cognitively involving people to thinking about their concrete
voting plan can increase the turnover, or motivate people to take vaccinations (Milkman et al.,
2011) or preventive screenings (Milkman et al., 2013). Our treatment variation therefore seeks
to enhance the cognitive involvement by administering simple, incentivized exercise questions
that motivate the villagers to engage in cognitive operations to obtain, by themselves, the rele-
vant cost information, rather than just passively noting these numbers as they are provided to
them.
Fourth, several papers proceed under the assumption that acquiring a more energy-efficient
product is optimal for a given consumer.7 By contrast, our data allows us not only to unpick
whether information provision affects the purchase decisions, but also whether it is likely to
improve household welfare.
5A related finding is that the decisions made change if people are induced to think in real rather than nominal
terms (Shafir et al., 1997; Fehr and Tyran, 2001).
6While previous literature has found evidence of limited attention (see, e.g., Chetty et al., 2009; Lacetera
et al., 2012), few studies have investigated how to increase consumer’s attention to increase their welfare.
7A notable exception is the study by Allcott and Taubinsky (2015), who conduct an artificial field experiment
with low-involvement products – incandescent lightbulbs versus compact fluorescent light bulbs (CFL’s) – on a
survey platform. They estimate a pretreatment demand curve to elicit the welfare effects of a CFL subsidy or
ban.
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3 Description of the Field Experiment
Domestic heating is regarded as a major source of pollution in northern China due to the heavy
reliance on coal or firewood by rural villagers (Duan et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2016). In 2017, the
Chinese government started to require that rural villagers phase out coal burning stoves and
switch to electric heating. This policy included subsidizing the upfront prices of air-conditioners
or electric heaters available in the market by a one-time, non-cumulative lump-sum subsidy of
1000 RMB (≈ USD 151) (Barrington-Leigh et al., 2019).8
Our study took place in 107 villages in northern Henan Province around the time period
where the subsidy was implemented. When the subsidy policy started, each household was
allowed to buy one of the subsidized products, either an air-conditioner (AC) or a heater. All
products were available in all villages of our study. The available AC’s and heaters differed in
their brands and types. Specifically, there were three types of air-conditioners in three different
brands with prices ranging from 2199 to 6699 RMB (340 - 1036 USD), as well as ten types
of heaters in six different brands with prices range from 190 to 2000 RMB (29 - 309 USD).
AC’s have the advantage that they can also be used for cooling. More importantly, other than
heaters, the available AC’s come in two different levels of energy efficiency, which makes a
careful consideration of the usage costs important. Therefore, we focus mostly on the purchase
patterns in case of AC.
3.1 Comparing AC’s
Each AC brand offered its AC in two variations with respect to energy efficiency, where ef-
ficiency level 1 (“AC1”) is more efficient than efficiency level 2 (“AC2”), and thus consumes
less electricity per unit of usage time for a given endowment with horsepower. On average, the
power difference between the two efficiency levels is about 0.1 kilowatt-hour. Whether AC1
constitutes a cheaper option for a given household, in terms of overall costs, depends on the
differences in the upfront prices relative to the savings in electricity expenditures due to its
higher level of energy efficiency. The upfront prices are directly available in the market, while
the usage costs depend on the energy efficiency levels, the local climate (Auffhammer, 2014;
Auffhammer and Mansur, 2014), income, and household habits (Li et al., 2018).
We obtain a threshold, in terms of usage hours, above which AC1 is the cheaper option by
applying the standard concept of degree days, which we shall outline in the next paragraph.
8The subsidy applied equally for the purchase of an air-conditioner or heater, and as such was not relevant
for the choice between the various products as analyzed by this paper.
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The main idea is to first obtain the number of relevant heating and cooling days in a given
time period, and then use these numbers to calculate the average usage hours or the kwh per
activity day that are minimally required to compensate for the higher upfront prices of the more
efficient AC.
Degree Days The concept of degree days is a common way to estimate the relationship
between household energy consumption and temperature. It is based on the aggregate deviations
of daily mean temperatures relative to a base temperature for the summer and winter seasons,
respectively. The underlying idea is that a household’s energy consumption becomes sensitive to
changes in outdoor temperatures only once the daily mean temperature is higher (lower) than
the summer (winter) base temperature (Thom, 1952, 1954; Cheng et al., 2018). The degree
days then are calculated as the aggregate number of heating days (NHD), where the daily mean
temperature falls below the base temperature in winter, and the number of cooling days (NCD),
where the daily mean temperature exceeds the base temperature in summer.
To apply the concept of degree days, one needs to fix appropriate base temperatures for the
summer and winter seasons that take into account the local climate and the peculiarities of the
Chinese region regarding heating and cooling. It is known that sensible estimates for the base
temperatures vary across geographical regions, and depend on regional economic circumstances
or on climate conditions (Spinoni et al., 2015). For example, the base temperature for heating
and cooling are 15 °C and 22 °C, respectively, in the United Kingdom (Kendon et al., 2017).9 To
obtain reasonable estimates of the NHD and the NCD for the region of our study – villages in
Northern China – we took into account the most commonly used base temperatures in studies
with Chinese data, the local climate characteristics, and the wealth level of villagers.
For the winter season, we used 5 °C as base temperature. This is the level at which indoor heat-
ing starts by the Chinese heating policy (MCPRC, 2003),10 and other energy studies for China
have used this as base temperature as well, e.g., Shi et al., 2016, 2018). Because rural poverty
may gradually be reduced as the economy develops, it is conceivable that villagers might have a
higher heating demand when adjusting to better living conditions (Luo et al., 2020). Therefore,
we also considered 15 °C, the lower criteria for heating in Europe, as an alternative base tem-
9See UK Government). In the US, these numbers are 18.3 °C for both seasons (Hansen et al., 1998). In case
of Europe, it is common to use 16 °C or 18 °C for the winter and 22 °C for the summer season (Zachariadis and
Pashourtidou, 2007; Bessec and Fouquau, 2008).
10There are two conditions for room heating according to the Chinese policy on the code for Design of Heating
Ventilation and Air Conditioning (GB50019-2003): (1) only areas with more than 90 days of below 5 °C in an
annual cycle from September 1 to August 31 can be heated; (2) the heating stars/ends when temperature is
below/above 5 °C for a continuous 5 day period.
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perature for the winter season. We mainly use this specification to check the robustness of our
results (the main results continue to hold). For the summer season, we proceeded similarly and
set the base temperature to 26 °C.11 This is close to the level used by other studies in China
(Li et al., 2018; Cheng et al., 2018).
Using the local daily temperatures, we calculate the number of heating days for base temperature
5 °C (NHD5) and base temperature 15 °C (NHD15), as well as the number of cooling days for
base temperature 26 °C (NCD) for the year 2017 and 2018. The corresponding results are
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Degree Days
NHD5 NHD15 NCD
Total AC using days Total AC using days
(NHD5 + NCD) (NHD15 + NCD)
2017 79 147 59 138 206
2018 80 140 70 150 210
Notes: NHD: number of heating days, NCD: number of cooling days. Since the heating season in Northern China lasts
from November to March, we only consider the daily mean temperatures in November, December, January, February, and
March (2017-2018) for calculating NHD5 and NHD15. Likewise, we use the daily mean temperatures in the summer months
June, July and August in 2017 and 2018 for calculating NCD.
Threshold Level We use the degree days in Table 1 to estimate the average costs for AC
usage with a standard back-of-the-envelope calculation. The average difference in the upfront
price between the AC1 and AC2 available to the villagers is 998 RMB (≈ USD 151). The mean
efficiency gain of 0.1 kilowatt-hours is the efficiency differences between an AC1 and an AC2
averaged over all brands. Further, the electricity price is regulated by the government and fixed
to 0.56 RMB (≈ USD 0.085) per kilowatt-hour for the area and duration of our field study. As
all AC’s come with an eight-year warranty, we assume an average life span of 8-year for an AC.
By Table 1, the average annual number of degree days (= days on which heating or cooling
takes place) based on the NHD5 criteria is about 145 days. That is, to make the more efficient
AC1 worthwhile, a household has to use its AC for at least 15.36 hours per degree day over
eight years.12 This duration can alternatively be expressed as a threshold level in terms of
electricity consumption. For example, the most efficient AC among all AC1’s available in the
market consumes about 1.3 kilo-watt per hour of heating. Based on the NHD5 calculation from
11According to the code for Design of Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (GB50019-2003), cooling days
start when the out-door air temperature exceeds 26 °C.
12That is 998
0.56∗0.1∗145∗8 ≈ 15.36. Likewise, there are about 200 degree days using the NHD15 criterion, implying
that a household needed to use its AC for at least 11.1 hours per day over eight years to compensate for the
difference in the upfront price.
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above, a household thus should use more than 15.36 ∗ 1.3 ≈ 20 kilo-watt hours per heating day
in order to make the purchase of this AC worthwhile.13
The above calculations suggest that AC1 is the favorable option, in terms of total expenditures,
for heavy-using households. In other words, a household needs to anticipate a substantial
amount of heating and cooling demand in order to compensate for the disadvantage of AC1
in terms of the upfront price. Whether many households in our study are above the threshold
making AC1 the favorable option is an empirical question. We shall return to this central
question in Section 5.2, where we use historical data on electricity consumption to infer a subset
of households for which AC1 constitutes a dominated option in terms of overall expenditures.
3.2 Confusion and Information
The main surmise of our study is that some households may misestimate the relevant cost
differences between AC’s of different energy efficiency levels, leading to suboptimal decisions.
More specifically, we assume that processing complex information, such as the comparative
costs of the various AC’s, can lead to confusion – the occurrence of unsystematic evaluation
mistakes – that, nevertheless, can systematically bias decisions away from the optimal choice.14
As counter measures, we propose that the provision of information which facilitates the relevant
comparisons, or which activates the cognitive involvement of households can reduce the scope of
confusion. We present a formal model of agent confusion capturing these notions in Appendix
B. This model provides a background for the information treatments we conduct, and its main
idea is outlined next.
Confusion Complex decisions involve comparing two or more choice options consisting of
many attributes. Such comparisons consume mental resources, and can be subject to perception
mistakes, as the human brain does not posses infinite mental capacities (Payne et al., 1993). In
case of our study, the households need to compare the total anticipated costs of AC’s that differ
in their energy efficiency. The costs of an AC consists of two components: The upfront price
and an anticipated usage cost. The upfront price is a single number and directly accessible
by the households in the marketing data. By contrast, deriving the appropriate usage costs
13We do not include any discount factor or interest rate in our calculations, mainly for simplicity and because
interest rates were essentially zero at the time of our study. We note that heavy discounting, e.g., due to strong
myopia, would bias the threshold favoring AC1 upwards - a point to which we shall return in the empirical
analysis again.
14Such a notion of confusion is well-founded in the psychological or the marketing literature; see Hefti et al.
(2020).
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involves mental operations such as forward-thinking and calculus. This makes the comparison
of the usage costs between different AC’s prone to evaluation mistakes.
We think of the extent to which evaluation mistakes in comparisons between the usage costs
can occur as the household’s state of confusion. The state of confusion congregates all aspects
that matter for forming a comparison as well as the overall attention the brain devotes to pro-
cessing these aspects, and we refer to the particular aspects as the various sources of confusion.
In our study, we conjecture that a major source of confusion is that people have difficulties
assessing the relevant opportunity costs of the products, e.g., because they have problems work-
ing with large money numbers, or because they fail to understand the real value of such money
amounts. That is, they may over- or underestimate the true economic advantage of an AC with
a higher energy efficiency due to an erroneous evaluation of the real opportunity costs.
Information Interventions Our central contention is that the evaluation mistakes are not
invariants, but can be alleviated if confusion in the various sources is reduced, or if the amount
of attention dispatched to information processing can be increased. Regarding the former,
providing the households with information that helps them to evaluate and compare the relevant
usage costs should therefore reduce confusion, which makes decision mistakes less likely to
occur.15
Specifically, we provide households with various sample calculations that are based on the
products in the market and illustrate the average opportunity costs associated with using the
less efficient AC (see Section 4.3 for details). From the perspective of normative economics,
rational consumers should consider the real opportunity cost of different options in order to
make the best purchase decision. For an AC1, the true value of its energy savings is reflected
in the potential purchasing power of the energy savings relative to AC2. However, it is been
shown that people tend to misestimate or even ignore opportunity costs when making a purchase
decision (Frederick et al., 2009).
In the “Pure Information” treatment – our baseline information intervention – we simply
express these opportunity costs in monetary units. In our other two treatment variations, we
provided the same information about the opportunity costs in a slightly different way.
15In the model, a reduction of confusion due to an information intervention is formalized by assuming that
(i) the largest perception errors cannot occur anymore and (ii) the relative odds of those perception errors that
can still occur remain constant. The latter is reasonable if the perception errors are an intrinsic consequence of
the brain, in thus that the statistical principle driving their dispersion cannot be altered by our simple, one-shot
information intervention. We show that whenever the confusion of one or several sources diminishes in the above
manner, the chance of making a decision mistake due to misperception must decrease.
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As all information treatments provide the same factual information about the opportunity costs,
the decision quality should be improved in all information treatments. By “increased decision
quality”, we mean that the chances of a household to correctly identify whether AC1 or AC2 is
the cheaper option given the energy consumption of the household should be larger. Hypothesis
HI summarizes this conjecture.
(HI) Information Effects The decision quality increases in all information treatments rel-
ative to the control villages.
In view of the educational situation in the villages, understanding the relevant opportunity
costs may be a particularly daunting task, even if explicit information about their nominal
values has been made available. Therefore, we suppose that if these numbers are converted into
quantities of a good known to the villagers from everyday life, this can facilitate the processing
of information about opportunity costs and further reduce confusion. In the “Milk” Treatment,
we express the opportunity costs in terms of the everyday commodity milk.16 As the “Milk”
Treatment provides the villagers with the same factual information as the “Pure Information”
treatment, but expresses this information in quantities which, as we conjecture, are easier to
evaluate, we hypothesize that the decision quality in the “Milk” treatment exceeds the one from
“Pure Information”.
(HII) Milk Treatment The decision quality in the “Milk” treatment exceeds the one in the
“Pure Information” treatment.
Another concern we have is that people might not allocate sufficient attention to the cost
comparison. Therefore, a treatment that can involve people to thinking more, or more carefully,
about the relevant costs may reduce confusion and improve decisions. In the “Involvement”
treatment, we pose the opportunity costs as a quiz challenge, rather than just displaying these
numbers to people. The conjecture is that it makes a difference whether people obtain certain
insights as a consequence of their own efforts and reflection, rather than just passively consuming
the same information.17 We therefore hypothesize that the decision quality increases in the
“Involvement” Treatment relative to “Pure Information”.
(HIII) Involvement Treatment The decision quality in the “Involvement” treatment ex-
16At the time of the study, one box of milk was about 35 RMB (USD 5.4). Milk was very popular among
local residents, and it was one of the most common presents that villagers made to others.
17According to the theory of “Rational Inattention”, the allocation of attention is under the full control of a
decision-maker, and chosen in an optimal manner. As the Involvement treatment does not provide new factual
information relative to the other information interventions, but seeks to activate household’s attention, we would
not expect the “Involvement Treatment” to affect the decision quality relative to “Pure Information” from the
perspective of rational inattention (see Appendix B.4).
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ceeds the one in the “Pure Information” treatment.
Note that while we predict the Milk and Involvement treatments to outperform Pure Informa-
tion, we do not have an ex ante hypothesis about the ranking between the Milk and Involvement
treatments. The reason is that the former is aimed at facilitating information processing in a
particular aspect, while the latter focuses more on influencing the overall attention and involve-
ment, and it is an empirical question which effect is stronger.
4 Implementation
In this section, we outline the implementation of the field study. We begin by describing the
randomization procedure (Section 4.1), and then present the time line of our study (Section
4.2). In Section 4.3, we explain how we implemented the information intervention based on the
hypotheses from Section 3.2. Finally, Section 4.4 presents details on our ex post survey.
4.1 Randomization
The sample of our field study encompassed 42,454 valid household contact numbers for 107
villages, which are located in seven townships. A township is a collection of villages that are
geographically close to each other. The seven townships are under the jurisdiction of Anyang
City, which is the northernmost city of Henan Province in China.
To test our main hypotheses, we partition the population into three treatment groups – one
for each information intervention – and a control group, which receives no additional information
from us. We form these four groups by a standard randomization procedure (Duflo et al., 2007),
stratified in three dimensions in 2018: the size of the population, the number of households,
and the average annual disposable income per capita at the township level. Table 2 provides
the outcome statistics of our randomization. We checked the validity of our randomization by
comparing all means across the four groups, and find no evidence that the groups differ in one
or more characteristics (see Appendix A.1).
Table 2 shows that the average annual disposable income per capita was 13,405 RMB (2073
USD) in 2018, i.e., 1.117 RMB (173 USD) per month. This is only about half of the price of
the cheapest air-conditioner after subsidization, showing that the decision to purchase an AC
clearly involves high stakes.
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Table 2: Sample composition
Full Sample Control Pure Information Milk Involvement
Variables Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of households 390.4 384.5 366.6 402.2 405.3
(239.6) (273.2) (200.0) (196.5) (278.4)
Population size 1552.8 1566.6 1462.2 1578.3 1590.0
(890.1) (978.5) (774.3) (814.3) (997.3)
Income (in RMB) 13405.5 13213.6 13541.6 13457.6 13450.6
(914.8) (930.1) (935.5) (923.6) (888.7)
Number of townships 7 7 6 7 7
Number of villages 107 30 23 27 27
Notes: Column 1-5 display sample means in the full sample, control group, and the three information treatments; standard
deviations are in parentheses. “Number of households” and “Population size” are at the village level. “Income” refers to
the average annual disposable income per capita at the township level in Chinese currency (RMB). “Number of township”
shows that almost all groups contained villages from each township.
4.2 Time Line
Our study took place during the period from 1st of June 2019 to November 3rd 2019. Events
occurred as follows. On June 1st, the government communicated the information about the
phase-out policy of coal to villagers, and the different companies started to promote their
products. The villagers could purchase any product at any time before October 1st 2019 to
collect the one-time subsidy of 1000 RMB.
We implemented our information treatments using first SMS messaging and later leaflets. The
actual SMS containing the treatment information was sent over 6 days from June 16-22. Our
SMS campaign thus was completed before all the subsidized products were made available to
villagers. During August 5-6, we visited all villages (expect for those in the control group), and
provided the households with the rewards if they answered the questions pertaining to our SMS
campaign correctly (see below). In addition, we distributed leaflets of energy saving information
to villagers who were at home. These leaflets contained exactly the same information as used
in the SMS of the various treatments. To help those illiterate to overcome reading difficulties,
we used figures to present the energy saving information on the leaflets.
To draw the villagers’ attention to our SMS campaign, we hung posters in the village’s
committee office on June 14, announcing that villagers were to receive an SMS from researchers
at ShanghaiTech University with information regarding the energy efficiency of the AC products
in the market. Additionally, this information was broadcasted by the committee’s offices of
the villages. Finally, we conducted the ex post survey in the villages on October 3-8, after the




Two days after the broadcast announcement by the village office, we started sending text mes-
sages to households in the treatment villages through an SMS platform. For each treatment, we
provided information on the average energy savings due to using a more efficient AC in three
hypothetical scenarios that only differ in the assumed frequencies of usage (high, medium, and
low). For each scenario, we sent three messages per day to each household.
Specifically, we sent a first SMS containing the information of a certain scenario in the morn-
ing, followed at noon by a question SMS about the information SMS sent in the morning. We
then sent the solution to the question on the same day in the evening. The villagers who cor-
rectly answered the SMS question by messaging back prior to receiving the solution obtained a
reward of 2 RMB, which we paid to them in cash during our visit in August. On the last day of
the SMS interventions, we sent an SMS containing the same question as at noon of the second
day. The villagers who answered this final question correctly were entitled to receiving a soap
during our visit in August.
We used this question-reward procedure in all information treatments to maximize the chance
that the SMS were considered by the villagers. In this respect, our ex-post survey indicates that
about half of the villages in the relevant sample received the SMS and found the information
to be helpful (see Appendix A.2).
Information Provided The information we provided in all information treatments was
aimed at making villagers aware of the possible energy-savings induced by AC1 relative to
AC2 depending on various usage patterns. The calculations we provided to the households were
based on the average difference in energy efficiency of the offered products, and thus contained
no information that was not available to the villagers.
We calculated the monetary value of energy savings over 1 year (short-term) and 8 years
(long-term) for daily usages of 12, 16, and 20 hours, given that a household uses its AC for
200 days per year.18 In the Pure Information treatment, we provided this information to the
households by separate SMS on subsequent days. More specifically, on the first day, households
received information about the cost saving over 1 and 8 years for a daily usage of 20 hours
over 200 days. On the second and third day, they received similar information using 16 and
12 hours of daily usage, respectively. As an example of the precise information we provided,
18The amount of 200 activity days is close to the number of relevant degree days (see Table 1).
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the households in the Pure Information treatment received an SMS in the morning of the first
day, stating that if a household were to use an AC with the higher efficiency level (AC1) for 20
hours on 200 days per year, then this household could save 225 RMB per year relative to using
an AC with the lower efficiency level (AC2).19
We conveyed the same factual information via SMS in our other two information treatments.
The key differences are as follows. In the “Milk” Treatment, we simply expressed the cost-
savings in units of milk. In the “Involvement” Treatment, we guided villagers to think about
how to calculate the average energy-savings if an AC1 was purchased. Specifically, we required
them to do the relevant savings calculations in each of the three scenarios by themselves. To
this end, we provided them in the morning SMS with a sample calculation, that states the
amount of money saved by using AC1 instead of AC2 for 1 hours in each of 200 days. Then,
we asked them in the noon SMS to deduce how much money they could save if they were to
use the AC for 12, 16 or 20 hours, respectively. Note that we ask the same question at noon in
all three treatments. The only difference is that, in the Involvement Treatment, the villagers
had to figure out the underlying calculations by themselves from the morning SMS, while they
could simply read the morning SMS again in the other two treatments.
A sample of the texts we used in each information treatments can be found in Appendix A.5.
The leaflets we distributed in early August contained exactly the same information as the
respective treatment SMS (see Appendix A.4). We used leaflets, besides SMS, to maximize the
number of villagers that became aware of our information campaign.20
4.4 Follow-up Survey
In a third visit to the villages (October 2019), we conducted a follow-up survey in 68 villages
including control and treatment villages. In total, 1245 villagers participate in the survey, where
364 were from 16 control villages, 230 were from 14 villages in the Pure Information treatment,
283 were from 19 villages in the Milk treatment, and 333 of them were from 19 villages in the
Involvement treatment.21
In the survey, we asked whether households in the treatment groups received, could under-
19The average energy saving for using AC1 rather than AC2 is 0.1 kwh, and the electricity price was fixed to
0.56 RMB per kwh during our study. Thus, a household saves 200 ∗ 20 ∗ 0.1 ∗ 0.56 ≈ 225 RMB per year.
20Our data does not allow us to distinguish between the information effects due to SMS or leaflets.
2135 surveys had partly unrecognizable information, and thus were excluded from our analysis.
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stand, and trusted the information we provided to them.22 Further, we asked about the factors
that they viewed important in their purchase decisions, and about demographic variables such
as the number of children at home, monthly family income, households’ time preferences, and
the education level. We also elicited households’ willingness to pay for an AC1 relative to AC2
using a second price sealed-bid auction. Moreover, we obtained the supposed frequencies of AC
usage in summer and winter.
Finally, we followed Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) and asked households what they believe
the intention of our information intervention is in order to assess whether our results could be
driven by a mere demand effect. We found that participants’ answers were strongly dispersed,
speaking against a commonly perceived intention of the study; see Appendix A.2. Jointly with
the facts that the decisions are not artificially created and involved high stakes, we view it as
highly unlikely that the results we find are significantly biased by a demand effect.
5 Empirical Results
The empirical results are organized as follows. We analyze the purchase behavior in treatment
and control villages in Section 5.1 graphically and by means of a standard regression framework.
In Section 5.2 we study whether the observed changes are likely to reflect an improvement in
individual welfare, by first exploiting data about the average heating consumption in the control
group and our survey data (Section 5.2.1), and then by identifying a subsample of households
for which the purchase of an AC1 most likely constitutes a decision mistake (Section 5.2.2).
5.1 Information Effects on AC purchases
Our main conjecture is that the villagers have difficulties with evaluating the cost information
available in the market when choosing their subsidized product. Therefore, the provision of
information aimed at facilitating the comparison of costs between AC’s with different efficiency
levels should help the villagers identify which product best fits their needs. This contrasts to
the standard tenet from microeconomics, where decision-makers are capable of processing all
available information in a uniformly identical way, or at the very least behave “as if” they could.
Under this premise, information that is essentially a convex combination of already available
information should not induce any systematic effects on the decisions made.
22In the ex post survey, we asked villagers to evaluate which AC was cheaper in terms of total costs for a
given daily usage pattern over 8 years. The survey data shows that among the villagers who confirmed to receive
our SMS a significantly larger fraction was able to correctly answer this survey question compared to the control
group.
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Therefore, a first elementary test of our conjecture is to see whether our information treat-
ments have any effect at all on the purchase decisions relative to the control group. If our
conjecture is correct, then we should be able to observe a change in the purchase patterns of
















Pure information Milk Involvement Pooled treatment
AC1 AC2
Figure 1: Relative differences of AC choices compared to control group
Notes: Bar plot of relative differences 4% between treatemnt and control villages. The ‘Pooled treatment’ aggregates
all information treatments.
Figure 1 displays the differences in AC purchases of the treatment groups relative to the
control group.24 For example, the first blue bar on the left shows that AC’s of the higher
efficiency level (i.e., AC1) are purchased 20% less often in the Pure Information treatment
compared to the control villages. The figure suggests that the information treatments had
an impact on AC purchase behavior. We next use a standard regression framework that can
account for unobserved village effects and other control variables to assess in a reliable way
whether our information intervention altered the purchase behavior.
5.1.1 Pooled Regression Evidence
Figure 1 suggests a substantial change in purchase behavior due to our information interventions.
To corroborate this visual impression, we next report the estimation results from a Multinomial
Logit (MNL) regression framework that allows us to make more reliable statements about the
23Note that this is a purely positive prediction, while our conjecture is normative. Thus, a mere change
of behavior cannot support our basic conjecture without additional information – in principle, the change in
purchases could also result because our information intervention confused households further. This is the topic
of Section 5.2.
24We delete purchases with incomplete record, which is either due to missing meter ID or missing record of
efficiency level. This gave us a total of 42,454 purchases for analysis. In total, there were 11,913 purchases from
villages of the control group, 9165, 10,744, and 10,632 purchases from villages in the Pure Information treatment,
Milk treatment, and Involvement treatment, respectively.
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possible shifts in the purchase patterns.
Each purchase decision is coded either as “AC1”, “AC2” or “Heater”. In all estimations,
the dependent variable is the purchase decision, where “Heater” serves as the base group. We
included two control variables in all regressions: the (subsidized) upfront price of the acquired
product, and the electricity consumption by each household; both in logs.25 We include the
former as the products of the different brands vary in their upfront prices, e.g., reflecting differ-
ences in horsepower or in the precise degree of energy efficiency. Regarding the latter, we seek to
control for household electricity consumption that is not related to heating or cooling behavior,
as this varies between households and is most likely correlated with household preferences, size
or disposable income. Therefore, we include Log(E + 1) as control variable in our regressions,
where E ≥ 0 is the monthly electricity consumption of a household in October 2019.26 Finally,
we also included township fixed effects to control for possible unobserved heterogeneity at the
township level.
In our first test, we assess whether the choices of AC1 and AC2 are different in treated villages
relative to those in the control villages, by pooling together all information treatments. The
results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. The variable of interest is “Information Treatment”,
which is a dummy variable indicating whether the household belongs to one of our three infor-
mation treatments; robust standard errors at the household level are in parentheses. Columns
1 and 2 display the estimates of the probability for choosing an AC1 or an AC2, respectively,
relative to choosing a heater in the control group. Columns 3-5 report the corresponding av-
erage marginal effects. These estimates show that the purchase behavior is significantly and
substantially different in the treated villages compared to the control group.
First, Column 4 shows that villagers in the treatment groups were on average 1.23 percentage
points less likely to choose an AC1 relative to a heater, which is significant at the 1%-level. To
gauge the magnitude of this effect, we use the purchase probability of AC1 in the control villages
as base probability, which is 11.8 percentage. Thus, information provision actually decreases the
probability of acquiring an AC1 by about 10.4 percent, which we deem a substantial effect.27
25We use the Log-transformation as this is common with skewed variables (see, e.g., Chen et al., 2017).
26The average daily temperature of the local area in October 2019 was 15.5 °C implying at most a very low
demand for heating. Moreover, October is the month right after the completion of subsidy policy, where the
subsidized products most likely are not used yet. Therefore, the monthly electricity consumption in October 2019
was likely to be associated with energy demand other than heating or cooling.
27Such an effect size is compatible with other field studies related to information. For example, Chen et al.
(2017) find that the information effect of social comparison on driving behavior is about 5%; Cai et al. (2009)
find that providing information about the ranking of the most popular dishes could increase dish demand by 13
to 20 percent.
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Second, Column 5 reveals that the likelihood of purchasing the less efficient AC2 is increased
by 0.3 percentage points among the villagers in the treatment groups; this effect is statistically
significant at the 5%-level. In terms of magnitudes, this amounts to an increase by 25% relative
to the control group.
Result 1 (Average Information effect) The average purchase behavior was significantly dif-
ferent in the treatment villages compared to the control group. Specifically, we estimated that
the fraction of AC1 purchases diminished by about 10%, while the fraction of AC2 purchases
increased by about 25%, relative to the control group.
In sum, the data shows that overall the information treatments had a substantial effect on the
purchase decisions. As mentioned at the outset, such evidence cannot by itself confirm that
information provision actually has improved the quality of choices. Nevertheless, it is consistent
with an implication of Hypothesis HI in thus that we would expect to observe some shift in
purchases if information actually were to reduce the amount of evaluation mistakes.
Columns 6-10 repeats the previous analysis. The only difference is that in Columns 1 - 5
we exclude 6814 households whose electricity consumption in October 2019 was missing.28 For
reasons of completeness and robustness, we also conducted all regressions with the full sample
of households, where we replaced the missing observations of electricity consumption with 0,
and added a missing indicator for each missing observation. The estimations in Columns 6-10
broadly confirm the findings summarized in Result 1.
Column 3 shows that villagers in the treatment group have a higher likelihood of acquiring a
heater relative to the control group. As we do not have an ex ante conjecture about heaters, we
discuss this findings in relation to our general interpretation of the empirical results in Appendix
A.3. We further remark that it is vital to include heaters in the MNL framework from the statis-
tical viewpoint, despite that our information treatments were entirely aimed at AC’s. Heaters
were among the feasible choice options, and not including them could cause a selection problem.
Panel B of Table 3 shows the effects of the three information treatments separately relative to
the control group. With respect to AC1, we find that only the Milk and Involvement treatments
have statistically significant effects on reducing the probability of buying an AC1. The -1.82
(-1.1) percentage points estimate of the Milk (Involvement) treatment in column 4 corresponds
28The missing electricity consumptions data from October 2019 to March 2020 indicates that these households
were most likely not living there during winter time. Thus, we have no information on how much electricity they
would have consumed otherwise. Further, we found that the households with missing data were balanced across
the various treatments and the control group.
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to a 15.4 (9.3) percent decrease in the choices of AC1. By contrast, column 5 shows that the
Pure Information treatment and Involvement treatment increase the likelihood of purchasing
AC2 by 0.33 percentage points (27.5% increase) and 0.7 percentage points (58.3% increase),
respectively, while the average marginal effect of the Milk treatment is not statistically different
from zero. In sum, this shows that the various information treatments seem to have different
effects on the purchase behavior. We consider these differences in greater detail in the next
section.
5.1.2 Comparing Information Treatments
By Hypotheses HII and HIII, the decision quality in the Milk and Involvement treatments
should exceed the one in Pure Information. In the spirit of the last section, we would therefore
expect to observe some differences in the respective purchase patterns. To assess this basic
conjecture, we compare the purchase probabilities of AC1 and AC2, respectively, with the ones
of the Pure Information treatment, using the same MNL framework as before. The results are
summarized in Table 4.29
We find that AC1 purchases are significantly lower in the Milk treatment compared to Pure
Information: The chance of acquiring an AC1 is 1.6 percentage point lower on average; this
effect is significant at the 1% level. We also observe that the chance of purchasing AC1 is 0.64
percentage points lower in the Involvement treatment, but this effect is only weakly significant.
Regarding AC2 purchases, we find strong statistical evidence that the Involvement treatment
increases the likelihood of acquiring AC2 relative to Pure Information: The chance of buying
an AC2 is 0.42 percentage points higher than in Pure Information. The Milk treatment shows
only weak evidence for a change of behavior.
Taken together, the evidence in Table 4 reveals some significant differences in the purchase
behavior in the Milk and Involvement treatment relative to Pure Information. Further, these
findings reinforce the baseline tendency we observed in Result 1 that providing qualified infor-
mation empirically reduces AC1 purchases and increases AC2 purchases.
29The estimations in Table 4 excludes households where we did not have data for the energy consumption in
October 2019. The results are robust to including all households, similar to the specifications used in Columns
6-10 of Table 3.
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Table 3: The effect of information provision on the decision of AC purchases
Average Marginal Effect Average Marginal Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Variables AC1 AC2 Heater AC1 AC2 AC1 AC2 Heater AC1 AC2
Panel A: Effect of the pooled information treatments
Information Treatments -0.22*** 0.15 0.0093*** -0.0123*** 0.0030** -0.25*** 0.08 0.0108*** -0.0129*** 0.0022*
(0.05) (0.11) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.05) (0.10) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0012)
Observations 35,640 42,454
Pseudo R2 0.4767 0.478
Panel B: Effect of each information treatment
Pure Information Treatment -0.06 0.23 0.0011 -0.0044 0.0033* -0.02 0.12 0.00004 -0.0016 0.0016
(0.07) (0.15) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0018) (0.07) (0.14) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0016)
Milk Treatment -0.37*** -0.25* 0.0196*** -0.0182*** -0.0013 -0.43*** -0.33** 0.0224*** -0.0204*** -0.0020
(0.07) (0.14) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0018) (0.06) (0.13) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0016)
Involvement Treatment -0.16** 0.48*** 0.0040 -0.0110*** 0.0070*** -0.21*** 0.43*** 0.0066** -0.0129*** 0.0063***
(0.07) (0.13) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0016) (0.06) (0.12) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0014)
Observations 35,640 42,454
Pseudo R2 0.4783 0.4801
Sample Dropped missing observations Replaced missing with 0, and added missing indicators
Notes: Control Variables (at the household level) are: i) The log of the price of the subsidized product acquired and ii) The log of electricity consumption in October 2019. We controlled for Township fixed
effects by including Township dummies. Because 6814 households’ electricity consumption in October 2019 were missing, they were excluded from the MNL estimations in column 1-5. In column 6-10, we
replaced the missing observations of electricity consumption with 0, and added a missing indicator for each missing observation. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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We summarize these insights next, where we convert the percentage points estimate into
percentage values, using the purchase probabilities of Pure Information as base.
Result 2 (Presentation Effects) The average purchase behavior was significantly different
in the Milk and Involvement treatments compared to the Pure Information treatment. The
likelihood of purchasing AC1 is about 17.7 percent lower in the Milk treatment relative to the
AC1 purchases in Pure Information. The likelihood of purchasing AC2 is about 38.2% higher
in the Involvement treatment, relative to the AC2 purchases in Pure Information.
Table 4: Milk and Involvement Treatments compared to Pure Information
Average Marginal Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables AC1 AC2 Heater AC1 AC2
Milk Treatment -0.36*** -0.43*** 0.0204*** -0.0166*** -0.0039*
(0.08) (0.16) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0020)
Involvement Treatment -0.10 0.28** 0.0022 -0.0064* 0.0042**
(0.07) (0.14) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0018)
Observations 25,249
Pseudo R2 0.46
Notes: For Columns 3-5 the reported coefficients are average marginal effects of the MNL estimations. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
5.2 Decision Quality
From the viewpoint of Hypotheses HI-HIII, we would expect that the purchase behavior in the
treated villages differs from the one in the respective control group. The statistical evidence,
summarized in Results 1 and 2, shows that the purchase behavior indeed was systematically
affected by the information treatments. Specifically, the more efficient AC1 is less likely and
the less efficient AC2 more likely to be chosen in treated villages. Nevertheless, the mere fact
that the behavior changes in this way does not confirm that the decision quality has effectively
improved. We address this central issue next.
Assuming that the observed changes indeed reflect an improved decision quality, the treatment
effect we found suggests that, among the households seeking to acquire an AC, the purchase mis-
takes are such that too many households acquire AC1, and too few AC2, absent any information
intervention. The data allows us to corroborate this conjecture in three ways.
First, we use the electricity data from the control villages to infer which AC efficiency level
actually constitutes the cheaper option on average. Second, we analyze the data from our ex
22
post survey to verify whether the reported daily usage hours are low enough to make AC1 a
dominated option. Third, we study a subsample of the data for which we can infer, with high
confidence, that AC1 is a dominated option for the respective households.
5.2.1 Average Heating in Control Villages and Survey Data
Our first falsification of the conjecture that AC1 actually constitutes a dominated option for
many households builds on the usage hours inferred from the electricity consumption of the
households in the control group. By our randomization procedure, these households should be
statistically similar to the households in the treatment groups.
In Section 3.1, we estimated that a household needs to use its AC for at least 15.36 hours per
day to make AC1 the cheaper option. The most efficient AC1, among all AC1’s available in the
market, consumes about 1.3kwh. Rounding this number down to 1kwh and using 80 days (see
Table 1) as a proxy for the winter season November 2019 - March 2020, a conservative back-of-
the-envelope calculation shows that a household needs to use at least 1229kwh (= 1×15.36×80)
for heating during this time period to make AC1 the cheaper option.30
We obtain a corresponding estimate for household electricity consumption due to heating
for the period November 2019 - March 2020 in the control villages from our data on total
electricity consumption as follows. This data includes the monthly electricity consumption for all
households in the villages from October 2019 to March 2020. The average daily temperature of
the local area in October 2019 is 15.5°C, which is substantially higher than the base temperature
for heating, meaning that villagers most likely do not heat during this month. Thus, we calculate
the electricity consumption for heating purpose in each successive winter month as the difference
between total electricity consumption in that month and the baseline electricity consumption
in October 2019.
Considering only households featuring a positive monthly electric heating consumption during
the winter season, this leaves us with 5158 households in the control villages. Among all these
households, only 25.6% have an electricity consumption due to heating above the threshold
value of 1229 kwh.31 This simple calculation strongly suggests that AC1 is a dominated option
for a majority of households in our sample.
30As before, we do not include any discount factor or interest rate in our calculations. Note that adding
such elements would actually decrease the usage cost advantage of AC1, making it even less attractive. Ignoring
discount factors and interest rates therefore amounts to a conservative testing strategy.
31If we also include households featuring a zero monthly electric heating consumption (e.g., because the
household was not populated during the period), this leaves us with 10407 households, out of which only 17%
have an electricity consumption due to heating above 1229kwh.
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Survey Data The data in our ex-post survey also reveals that AC1 seems to be a dominated
option for most households. Specifically, we found that only about 20% of the villagers indi-
cated that their daily usage of AC was more than 10 hours during both the heating season and
the cooling season, which suggests that at least 80% of them have used AC less than the 15.36
hours that are needed to make acquiring AC1 worthwhile.
Taken together, the above two results indicate that the reduction in AC1 purchases, and the
increase in AC2 purchases, likely amount to an improved assessment of the relative cost advan-
tages by the households due to our information interventions, leading to fewer decision mistakes
(i.e., not acquiring AC1 anymore).
Result 3 The heating pattern of the households in the control group and the data from the ex-
post survey suggest that AC1 is a dominated option, in terms of total costs, for a clear majority
of households. In this respect, Results 1 and 2 support that our information interventions have
successfully improved the decision quality, as AC1 is less often and AC2 more often acquired
under our information treatments.
5.2.2 Purchase Mistakes
Result 3 is based on pro rata considerations, rather than on individual choices. We now use
the monthly heating data in the winter months for all households to identify a subsample of
households for which we can reasonable argue that AC1 constitutes a dominated option.
As mentioned before, an average daily usage of 15.36 hours of activity are required to make
AC1 cheaper than AC2 on average. Using 80 as a proxy for the heating days from November
2019 - March 2020 and the most efficient AC1 in the market (1.3kwh electricity consumption
per activity hour), this shows that AC1 is a dominated option, in terms of total usage costs, for
a household with less than 1597kwh (≈ 15.36× 1.3× 80).
We now conduct another set of regressions based on the subsample of households with a pos-
itive monthly electricity consumption pertaining to heating that, in total, was below 1597kwh
for the period November 2019 - March 2020. That is, this subsample consists of households
across treatment and control groups for which it is highly likely that AC1 is dominated by AC2
in terms of total costs.
Given the construction of this subsample, we operationalize Hypothesis HI by testing whether
the probability of conducting a decision mistake, i.e., acquiring AC1 while this is a dominated
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option, is lower in the information treatments than in the control group. Accordingly, we define
an indicator variable, which is “1” if a household acquired AC1 (i.e., conducted a decision
mistake) and “0” otherwise (in which case the household acquired AC2 or a heater).
Table 5, Panel A, contains the corresponding regressions, using a Probit, Logit and OLS
specification, respectively, with the same set of controls we used in our previous regressions.
Column (1) shows the average marginal treatment effect of a Probit regression where we pool all
Table 5: The informational effect on purchase mistakes
Probit Logit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake
Panel A: Information Treatments vs control
Information treatments -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Pure Information Treatment 0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Milk Treatment -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Involvement Treatment -0.007** -0.009** -0.009**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 31027 31027 31027 31027 31027 31027
(Pseudo-)R2 0.538 0.539 0.531 0.532 0.381 0.381
Panel B: Milk or Involvement Treatment vs Pure Information Treatment
Milk Treatment -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Involvement Treatment -0.008** -0.007* -0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 21696 21696 21696
(Pseudo-)R2 0.527 0.520 0.359
Notes: In columns 1-4, the reported coefficients are the average marginal effects of a Probit or Logit specification.
Observations only include cases where the amount of electricity consumption for heating purpose is smaller than 1597
kilo-wat hours for the whole winter heating period. “Mistake” is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the household had
purchased AC1 that was definitely not an optimal choice for that household, and 0 otherwise. In all the specifications, we
have the same control variables as used in Table 3 and Table 4. They are the subsidized upfront price of the purchased
product, the Log(E + 1) transformation of monthly electricity consumption of households in October 2019, and township
dummies.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
information treatments together. We find that the information interventions on average reduce
the likelihood of purchase mistakes by 0.8 percentage point, which is significant at the 1% level.
As the base probability of acquiring AC1 in the control group of our subsample is 0.114, this
amounts to a 7 percent reduction (−0.008/0.114 ≈ −7%) of the purchase mistakes made relative
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to the control villages. This insight is essentially confirmed by the Logit and OLS estimations,
respectively (Columns 3 and 5). Further, this insight is robust to replacing the cutoff electricity
consumption that defines our subsample by the degree days based on the NHD15 criterion.32
Result 4 (Decision Mistakes) The likelihood of making a decision mistake (purchasing a
dominated option) is significantly and substantially reduced in the information treatment com-
pared to the control group, consistent with Hypothesis HI.
5.2.3 Presentation Effects
Columns 2,4 and 6 of Table 5 estimate the likelihood of acquiring AC1 for each information
treatment separately, relative to the control group. The most striking observation is that only
the coefficients on the Milk and Involvement treatments are statistically significant, but not the
ones on Pure Information. This suggests that the decision mistakes diminished if the informa-
tion was presented in a more accessible or more motivating way, as conjectured by Hypotheses
HII and HIII.
Panel B of Table 5 compares the Milk and Involvement Treatment to Pure Information, using
the same type of regressions as in Panel A. In case of the Probit estimation, Table 5 shows that
the Milk treatment outperforms Pure Information in thus that it reduces the purchase mistakes
by 1.7 percentage points, which is significant at the 1% level, and amounts to a 18.9% reduction
of the mistakes made relative to Pure Information. Likewise, we find that the Involvement
Treatment reduces the decision mistakes by 0.8 percentage points, which corresponds to a
reduction of about 9% of decision mistakes relative to Pure Information.
In sum, the evidence clearly indicates that people are less likely to choose the dominated
option (AC1) in the Milk and Involvement Treatment relative to Pure information, consistent
with Hypotheses HII and HIII.
Result 5 (Presentation Effects) The Milk and Involvement Treatments significantly reduce
the likelihood of purchase mistakes by 11.4% and 6% relative to the control group. Moreover, both
treatments reduce the decision mistakes significantly more than Pure Information, consistent
with Hypotheses HII and HIII.
32We repeated all the regression analysis in Table 5 using the NHD15 as another estimation of the annual
heating days. In particular, we take the average of NHD15 in 2017 and 2018 (143 days) as the annual heating days,
and the average of NHD15+NCD in 2017 and 2018 (208 days) as the annual AC usage. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation pinpoints the cutoff point for daily AC usage at 10.7 hours, suggesting that households consuming
less than 1991 kilowatt-hours (10.7 × 1.3 × 143 ≈1991 kWh) of electric heating should not purchase an AC1.
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Finally, we note from the follow-up survey that about half of the households stated that they
received and considered the SMS. While this is a reasonable amount, it shows that the above
numbers possibly underestimate the impact of our information intervention on those households
that actually considered the SMS. That is, if we assume that only about half of the villagers in
the treatment groups considered the SMS, we could roughly double the probability estimates
in Result 5 to gauge the effect of the information intervention on those who actually considered
the SMS.33
While our information treatments reduce the demand for the more efficient AC, this type
of AC is still chosen more often than its less efficient counterpart, despite that it likely is a
dominated option for many households.34 One reason could be that many villagers may not
have paid attention to our information campaign at all, or that the information may not have
been accessible, e.g., due to problems of illiteracy.
Another reason could be strong environmental preferences, favoring the more efficient AC1.
Nevertheless, the poor educational situation and the sometimes tenuous financial situation of
the households shed doubts that environmental concerns really are driving individual decisions.
In this respect, our ex post survey also revealed that a majority of households actually think
that AC1 constitutes the cheaper option, despite stating heating and cooling preferences which
are far too low to warrant such a conclusion.
6 Conclusion
We presented a large-scale randomized field experiment designed to study whether the provi-
sion of qualified information affects, and possibly improves, the high-stakes purchase decisions
made by households in a rural Chinese area. The study exploited a policy intervention by the
government, requiring villagers to replace their coal-based stoves by acquiring electric appli-
ances in the market, such as air-conditioners, which can be used for heating and cooling. These
air-conditioners were available in two different levels of energy efficiency across brands. Thus,
households faced a trade-off between paying higher upfront prices for a more efficient AC while
potentially saving on electricity costs due to the higher energy efficiency.
An adequate economic evaluation thus requires careful deliberation about the anticipated
33Nevertheless, it is clear that a consistent evaluation of how effective an information intervention is, must
include whether the information was considered at all in the first place.
34A similar observation is made by Stadelmann (2020) in case of white goods.
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usage costs, and cognitive efforts in conducting the relevant calculations. Given the educational
situation in the villages of our study – most villagers do not have higher eduction – identifying
and comparing the relevant costs most likely imposes a substantial challenge to the villagers,
and therefore is prone to evaluation mistakes.
In view of this presumed intricacy, we propose that providing qualified information about the
opportunity costs pertaining to the usage of the less efficient AC can improve the quality of
the purchase decisions made. Nevertheless, we also conjecture that mere numerical information
may be too abstract and intangible for villagers to process. Thus, the provision of nominal cost
information may be of limited efficacy for improving decision quality.
To investigate this possibility, we develop two novel treatment variations, based on different
considerations. In the first, we make the opportunity costs salient by expressing them in terms
of a real good – milk – the villagers know from everyday life. In the second, we pose the so-
lutions to the calculations about the opportunity costs as a quiz, rather than just displaying
this information passively, with the goal of enhancing attention and the cognitive involvement
of villagers. All treatments provided the same factual information about the opportunity costs.
The data shows a substantial difference in the purchases made between treatment and control
villages. Specifically, we observe a reduction in the purchases of the more energy efficient AC’s
but an increase in purchases of the less efficient AC’s. The data of our follow-up survey and
a back-of-the-envelope calculation regarding heating costs both indicate that the more efficient
AC indeed seems to be a dominated option in terms of total costs for a substantial majority of
households.
To further vindicate whether the observed changes are likely to constitute an improvement
in individual welfare, we identify a subsample of households to which the more efficient AC
most likely constitutes a dominated option, based on each household’s usage pattern. The
corresponding data corroborates that the likelihood of purchasing a more efficient AC – and thus
conducting a decision mistake – is significantly and substantially decreased in the information
treatments. Moreover, we find that this effect is driven by the Milk and Involvement treatments.
This strongly suggests that, at least in the context of our study, providing information in a
more accessible or cognitively enhancing way clearly outperforms the provision of purely factual
information.
More generally, the result that the Milk treatment improves the decision quality relative to
Pure Information is consistent with the finding that individuals exhibit distinct behaviors when
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choice are presented in real rather than in nominal terms (Shafir et al., 1997; Fehr and Tyran,
2001). Similarly, the positive impact of the Involvement treatment relative to Pure Information
adds to papers demonstrating that enhancing mental involvement and attention helps people
taking actions and reaching better decisions (Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006; Hettema et al.,
2005; Carrera et al., 2018).
The providers of the more efficient AC advertise its higher efficiency, inter alia, with a corre-
sponding efficiency label. Such labels may have the adverse effect of confusing some consumers
by inducing an overly optimistic estimation of the tentative cost savings. This may explain why
high upfront prices might be part of a successful equilibrium strategy in the market (Hefti et al.,
2020). In this respect, our findings suggest that policy makers may want to design, e.g., energy
efficiency labels in a way making sure that the real cost savings associated with a certain label
are properly understood by the relevant recipients.
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A Online Appendix: Supplementary Material
A.1 Balanced Data
To test whether our randomization procedure resulted in a balanced partition of the population
with respect to the observable data, we conducted the following t-tests based on the data
summarized in Table 2. As can be seen from the table, we cannot reject equality of the means
in any binary comparison that can be made.













Number of households 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.53 0.58 0.96
Population size 0.68 0.96 0.93 0.61 0.62 0.96
Inome (RMB) 0.21 0.33 0.33 0.75 0.73 0.98
A.2 Follow-up Survey
In this section, we report on the results of our follow-up survey related to the SMS intervention
and the possibility of a demand effect.
Demand Effect We follow Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) to examine if there is a demand
effect on the purchases decisions. If the survey participants cannot easily infer the intent of
the study, then it is less likely that there is a demand effect. In the post-experiment survey,
we asked participants what they thought the intent of the study was. Table 7 shows that the
perceived intent in each group was highly dispersed, speaking against the presence of a demand
effect.
SMS Reception In order to gauge whether our SMS interventions were registered by the
villagers, we asked survey participants in the treatment groups the following questions: 1.
whether they had received either SMS or leaflets from researchers from ShanghaiTech University;
2. whether they were aware of the provided information even if they did not receive any
information from the researchers (e.g., by means of “word-to-mouth”). The 1st row of Table
8 shows that there were 30% ∼ 50% of the respondents received the information, suggesting
that our interventions reached a reasonable amount of villagers. In terms of villagers’ trust in
the information as well as the usefulness of the information, we also asked survey participants
how trustworthy the information were on a scale from 1 to 5, and whether the information was
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Table 7: Perceived Intent of the Study by survey participants
(1) (2) (3) (4)






1. Sales promotion for AC1 0.10 0.14 0.19 0.14
2. Understand why people buy AC1 vs. AC2 0.34 0.26 0.19 0.29
3. Understand the effect of price factor on AC purchases 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.11
4. Test whether the ability to calculate energy costs affects
purchase decisions on AC.
0.21 0.13 0.16 0.14
5. Understand what functions of AC’s are the most im-
portant to people
0.24 0.24 0.25 0.24
6. None of the above 0.28 0.33 0.27 0.27
Number of Respondents 366 230 282 333
Notes: This table presents the share of villagers in each group who responded to the question of the intent of the study.
useful in their purchase decision. Table 8 shows the share of respondents for each question in
each treatment group. It clearly shows that villagers highly trust the information. Moreover,
more than half of the respondents in each treatment group found the information useful, while
many of the remaining respondents were not sure or could not understand the information due
to illiteracy.





receive SMS or leaflet or aware of the information
0.48 0.41 0.32
Number of Respondents 228 280 330
Trust information 0.96 0.92 0.95
Number of Respondents 209 224 303
Information is useful 0.50 0.50 0.63
Number of Respondents 109 146 106
Notes: This table presents the share of villagers in each group. “Receive information” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the survey participant indicated that s/he had received either SMS or leaflet, or were aware of the information from others,
0 otherwise. “Trust information” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the survey participant revealed that s/he trusted or
fully trusted the provided information, 0 if s/he was not sure, or did not trust the information completely . “Information
is useful” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the survey participant found the information useful, 0 if s/he found it not
useful, or did not care about the information, or did not know, or could not understand the information.
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A.3 Demand for Heaters
While our study squarely focused on AC purchases, mainly because heaters did not feature
different energy efficiency levels, we observe in Table 3, Panel A, that the probability of
acquiring a heater is significantly higher in the pooled information treatments than in the
control group.35 Panel B further reveals that this effect is driven by the Milk treatment.
While we do not have an ex ante hypothesis on the effects of our information intervention on
the demand for heater, we believe that this empirical pattern is not at odds with our findings
regarding AC purchases.
In our follow-up survey, we extracted the Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) for AC1 and AC2 using
a second-price auction as incentive scheme.36 Table 9 presents the results, where we regress the
WTP for AC1 and AC2 by OLS on the various information treatments. The table shows that
the Milk Treatment significantly reduces the WTP for AC1 and AC2 compared to the control
group, while no other treatment had such an effect.
Table 9: WTP relative to control group
(1) (2)
Variables WTPAC1 WTPAC2
Pure Information Treatment -15.624 -4.136
(83.694) (76.556)
Milk Treatment -235.768*** -131.644**
(65.888) (61.333)




Notes: “WTPAC1” and “WTPAC2” are villagers’ stated WTP for AC1 and AC2, respectively. We excluded invalid
cases where WTP was either negative or greater than the highest market price. We controlled for township fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
In terms of interpretation, we believe that this finding can be reconciled with the increased
demand for heaters in the Milk Treatment in the following sense. The WTP corresponds to
the maximal upfront price somebody wants to pay for an AC. This price, in principle, accounts
for preferences as well as the anticipated usage costs. Thus, if the estimated usage costs were
35The fact that heaters were the most frequently purchased type of appliance is not surprising as heaters are
substantially cheaper in terms of upfront prices than AC’s.
36We used a second-price sealed-bid auction for two AC’s with identical features, except for the energy efficiency
level. The participant with the highest willingness to pay for the randomly selected AC will receive the AC and
pay the second highest willingness to pay.
35
to increase in the Milk treatment while preferences are unaffected, this would manifest itself
through a lower WTP.
Table 9 shows that the WTP for AC generally is lower than in the control group, which
indicates that, indeed, people may have a tendency to underestimate the usage costs of AC’s,
which the Milk treatment effectively corrects.37 Such an effect is intuitive because, among all
information treatments, the Milk treatment is the only one to make the real value of the costs
salient. But if the households’ cost estimates increase in general, this tends to shift demand
towards the substantially cheaper heaters (upfront prices vary from 190 to 2000 RMB), in
particular for households that are close to indifferent between heater and AC in terms of true
preferences. This provides a possible explanation for why we observe an increase in the demand
for heaters in the Milk treatment, but not so in the other treatments.
A.4 Leaflets
37In our formal model in Appendix B, we derive our hypotheses about AC1 and AC2 under the neutral
presumption that the perception errors are symmetrically dispersed. We still obtain the same predictions if
people tend to underestimate usage costs.
36
On average, the power difference between the two energy 
efficiency levels across all brands and all AC types is about 
0.1 kilowatt-hour. (The smaller the power, the more energy 
savings.) All the calculations below are based on this 
parameter. 
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Figure 2: The leaflet for the pure information treatment
A.5 SMS
Table 10 illustrates examples of the messages used in this study for all three information treat-
ments.
37
On average, the power difference between the two energy 
efficiency levels across all brands and all AC types is about 
0.1 kilowatt-hour. (The smaller the power, the more energy 
savings.) All the calculations below are based on this 
parameter. 
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Figure 3: The leaflet for the opportunity cost treatment
38
(FRONT) 
1. If you use an efficiency-1 AC on 200 days per year for 1 
hours per day, then you can save 90 CNY over 8 years 
relative to an efficiency- 2 AC. If you use AC on 200 days 
per year for 12 hours per day, how much can you save over 8 
years if you use an efficiency-1 AC relative to an efficiency-2 
AC?    
Please choose your answer: (1) 1080 CNY, (2) 880 CNY, (3) 
680 CNY. 
 
2. If you use an efficiency-1 AC on 40 days per year for 16 
hours per day, then you can save 287 CNY over 8 years 
relative to an efficiency- 2 AC. If you use AC on 200 days 
per year for 16 hours per day, how much can you save over 8 
years if you use an efficiency-1 AC relative to an efficiency-2 
AC?    
Please choose your answer: (1) 1700 CNY, (2) 1435 CNY, 
(3) 1000 CNY. 
 
3. If you use an efficiency-1 AC on 200 days per year for 1 
hours per day, then you can save 90 CNY over 8 years 
relative to an efficiency- 2 AC. If you use AC on 200 days 
per year for 20 hours per day, how much can you save over 8 
years if you use an efficiency-1 AC relative to an efficiency-2 
AC?    
Please choose your answer: (1) 1800 CNY, (2) 1500 CNY, 
(3) 1000 CNY. 
 
The answers are on the back. 
Figure 4: The leaflet for the involvement treatment (front)
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(BACK) 
Answer:1. 1080 CNY；2. 1435 CNY；3. 1800 CNY 
On average, the power difference between the two energy 
efficiency levels across all brands and all AC types is about 0.1 
kilowatt-hour. (The smaller the power, the more energy 
savings.) All the calculations below are based on this parameter. 
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Figure 5: The leaflet for the involvement treatment (Back)
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Table 10: SMS Examples




An AC with a higher efficiency costs more
when you buy it, but you may save money
because it is more efficient. The more you
use your AC the more you save with a
more efficient AC. Example: if you use an
efficiency-1 AC on 200 days per year for 20
hours per day, then you can save 225 RMB
per year, or 1800 RMB over 8 years relative
to an efficiency-2 AC. [ShanghaiTech]
If you use AC on 200 days per year for 20
hours per day, how much can you save over
8 years if you use an efficiency-1 AC relative
to an efficiency-2 AC? [ShanghaiTech]
1800 RMB. On average, the power differ-
ence between the two energy efficiency levels
across all brands and all AC types is about
0.1 kilowatt-hour. All the calculations are
based on this parameter. [ShanghaiTech]
Milk Treatment An AC with a higher efficiency costs more
when you buy it, but you may save money
because it is more efficient. The more you
use your AC the more you save with a
more efficient AC. Example: if you use an
efficiency-1 AC on 200 days per year for
20 hours per day, then you can save 225
RMB (equal to about 6.5 boxes of milk) per
year, or 1800 RMB (about 51 boxes of milk)
over 8 years relative to an efficiency-2 AC.
[ShanghaiTech]
If you use AC on 200 days per year for 20
hours per day, how much can you save over
8 years if you use an efficiency-1 AC relative
to an efficiency-2 AC, and how many boxes
of milk does it equal to? [ShanghaiTech]
1800 RMB, 51 boxes of milk. On average,
the power difference between the two en-
ergy efficiency levels across all brands and
all AC types is about 0.1 kilowatt-hour. All




An AC with a higher efficiency costs more
when you buy it, but you may save money
because it is more efficient. The more you
use your AC the more you save with a
more efficient AC. Example: if you use an
efficiency-1 AC on 200 days per year for 1
hours per day, then you can save 90 RMB
over 8 years relative to an efficiency-2 AC.
[ShanghaiTech]
If you use AC on 200 days per year for 20
hours per day, how much can you save over 8
years if you use an efficiency-1 AC relative
to an efficiency-2 AC? Please choose your
answer: 1800 RMB, 1500 RMB, 1000 RMB.
[ShanghaiTech]
If you use AC on 200 days per year for
20 hours per day, you can save 225 RMB
from an efficiency-1 AC, and 1800 RMB
over 8 years. On average, the power differ-
ence between the two energy efficiency levels
across all brands and all AC types is about
0.1 kilowatt-hour. All the calculations are
based on this parameter. [ShanghaiTech]
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B Online Appendix: Model of Misperception
In the following, we present a model of misperception which provides a rigorous basis for the
intuitive hypothesis we stated in Section of the main text. This section is structured as following.
In Section B.1 we derive a simple model of product comparisons with misperceptions in the
context of our study, and show in Section B.2 that interventions which either improve the
quality of the information available or the attention devoted to the decision problem can reduce
the likelihood of making a decision mistake due to misperception. In Section B.3 we make the
connection to our information treatment explicit. Finally, we consider the case where attention
is optimally allocated by the household itself given its available information in Section B.4, and
show that our main prediction that improved information can diminish the likelihood of making
decision mistakes applies in this case as well.
B.1 Product Comparisons and Misperceptions
Let F̂j denote the overall expenditure that a household associates with AC j ∈ {1, 2}. We
assume that perceived and effective expenditures may differ according to cognitive difficulties
associated with deriving the appropriate costs. Hence we let F̂j 6= Fj in general, where the latter
denotes effective expenditures. Further, we suppose that expenditures (effective and perceived)
may be decomposed as Fj = pj +Qj , where pj denotes the upfront price of AC j and Qj is the
expected cost of usage.38
Compared to the upfront price pj , obtaining an estimate of the usage costQj involves cognitive
operations and information processing, and as such is subject to possible mistakes. Therefore,
we assume that perceived and effective expenditures may differ only due to misperceptions in
Qj .
39 Thus we let
F̂j = pj + Q̂j , (1)
where pj is the upfront price of AC j, and Q̂j is the perceived anticipated cost of usage.
Consider a household that intends to purchase an AC j ∈ {1, 2}, where the anticipated
total costs F̂ are determined according to (1). The household acquires the AC which appears
to be less expensive. Specifically, j = 2 is acquired if F̂2 < F̂1. Letting p1 − p2 ≡ ∆p and
∆Q̂ ≡ Q̂2 − Q̂1, the household thus acquires j = 2 whenever
∆p > ∆Q̂. (2)
38Thus, Qj is the present value of the expected discounted future energy costs of heating and cooling, and
depends on electricity prices, weather patterns, household preferences and usage.
39This is consistent with a leading assumption in the behavioral IO literature: In situations where the overall
price of a product has multiple components, decision mistakes are assumed to occur via the price component
which is less accessible to consumers (see, e.g., Spiegler, 2011; Grubb, 2015 for overviews).
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In the following we suppose that ∆p > 0 and ∆Q > 0, reflecting the fact that while AC j = 1
is more expensive regarding the upfront price, its improved energy efficiency leads to a cost
advantage in the usage costs for any fixed and given amount of usage. We suppose that the
misperception per unit of cost difference is quantified by a random variable X > 0 according to
∆Q̂ = X∆Q. (3)
A household with X > 1(< 1) overvalue (undervalue) the usage cost advantage of j = 2. By
(3) we assume that the size of the misperception varies with the magnitude of ∆Qj , meaning
that for any given X 6= 1, the misperception ∆Q̂ becomes negligible if the actual cost advantage
∆Q is small. That small differences also imply small mistakes seems an intuitive property to
impose on the nature of perception errors, In particular, we deem this more reasonable than to
assume a constant additive error which is independent of the magnitude of ∆Q.40
It shall be formally more convenient to replace X by the random variable defined by ε ≡ X−1,
noting that always ε > −1. By (2) and (3), the household then acquires the less efficient AC




− 1 ≡ w. (4)
As ∆p−∆Q∆Q measures the relative advantage of the less efficient AC j = 2, condition (4) says that
a household correctly chooses j = 2 whenever its misperception ε is smaller than the relative
advantage of j = 2.
We refer to the random variable ε as the aggregate cost misperceptions, and think of these
as composed of several different sources of misperception. We assume that these sources are
not simply invariant characteristics of a household, but that they depend on the information
available to the household as well as on the attention devoted to the decision problem by the
household.
To make things explicit, we illustrate this notion of perception mistakes considering the simple
case of two sources of perception errors.41 Specifically, let
ε = α1Y1 + α2Y2 ≡ X1 +X2, (5)
where Y1, Y2 are two continuous and independent random variables capturing two different
sources of confusion, and α1, α2 > 0 are weights quantifying the relative impact of the possible
40Because ∆Q̂ = ∆Q̂2−∆Q̂1 in the above derivation, one could also seek to derive ∆Q̂ by putting a stochastic
structure on the seemingly more primitive variables ∆Q̂1,∆Q̂2. This approach, however, would not add generality
to the model as we shall assume a zero-symmetric distribution of the possible perception mistakes ∆Q̂, which
implies that ∆Q̂ can always be decomposed into a sum of two zero-symmetric random variables (Rubin and
Sellke, 1986). Moreover, we believe that at least a part of the possible perception mistakes comes from the fact
that a household needs to compare usage costs besides deriving them.
41It should become clear from the subsequent derivations that our results easily generalize to the case of n
different sources.
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perception errors of the two sources on aggregate misperception.42 Wlog, we impose all relevant
statistical properties on Xj ≡ αjYj (rather than on Yj).
For example, one conceivable source of misperception in the context of our empirical study is
that households may misjudge costs because they have difficulties processing large and largely
abstract numbers, as opposed to thinking in opportunity costs expressed, e.g., in units of milk.
For illustrative purpose, we shall assume that X1 capture the errors made due to such misper-
ception, while X2 collates all other sources of misperceptions.
Let X1, X2 be continuous random variables with density functions f1(·), f2(·), respectively.
We consider the case of unsystematic perception errors, meaning that the possible mispercep-
tions could over- or undervalue the true costs with equal probability. Such a notion of unbiased
confusion is supported by a lot of evidence from consumer research, marketing and psychology
(Hefti et al., 2020). We therefore assume that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, Xi is a symmetric random
variable, i.e., its density fi(·) is symmetric at zero with (−s̄i, s̄i), s̄i > 0. It follows that the
aggregate misperception ε in (5) then also has a zero-symmetric density fε(x) with support
(−s, s), s = s̄1 + s̄2.
By (4) and (5), the probability that the household chooses AC j = 2 is
Pr(ε < w) = Fε(w) =
∫ ∞
−∞
F1(w + e)f2(e)de, (6)
where F1(·) is the CDF pertaining to X1. If ∆p > ∆Q (hence w > 0), the less efficient AC
j = 2 is the optimal choice for the household, and in the following we take w > 0 as given.43
Because ε is zero-symmetric Fε(w) > 1/2, and Fε(w) = 1 if there are no misperceptions at all
(i.e., X1, X2 both are degenerate at zero).
B.2 Mental States and Information Interventions
We now develop the idea that the different sources of perception errors depend on the infor-
mation available to a household as well as on the attention devoted to the decision problem.
Formally, we assume that each Xj is a function of (mj , Ij) ∈ R2+, where mj quantifies the amount
of attention devoted to source j and Ij measures the quality of the information available to the
household about that source. That is, an element (m, I) ≡ {(m1, Ii), (m2, I2)} ∈ M ⊂ R4+
represents the mental state of a household when evaluating the two AC’s, and thus
ε(m, I) = X1(m1, I1) +X2(m2, I2)
describes the dispersion of misperceptions given mental state (m, I).
42We essentially add the weights α1, α2 to add realism, as this captures that not all sources might contribute
equally to the aggregate decision mistakes. For the qualitative results derived below, the play no role.
43A similar analysis would pertain to the case where j = 1 were optimal (w < 0).
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This setting becomes meaningful by specifying how exactly a change in mental states can
affect the dispersion of misperceptions in each source. Acknowledging that an intimate connec-
tion between information and attention may exist for various reasons,44 we only seek to impose
the intuitive monotonicity assumption that more attention, i.e., a more careful consideration of
the choice options, as well as improved information can diminish the misperceptions resulting
from one or multiple sources.45
By “diminished” we mean that the magnitude of the strongest perception errors is reduced,
while the relative odds of the remaining perception errors remains constant. The motivation for
these structural assumptions is that if the brain still makes unsystematic perception mistakes,
the errors that may arise should be dispersed by the same statistical principle as before, but
the scope for errors has been reduced.46
Formally, these assumptions mean that interventions induce symmetric truncations of the
perception errors Xj , which we make more precise next. Let (m, I) = (0, 0) denote the (nor-
malized) situation featuring both minimal information and attention. Thus, misperception in
each Xj is given by a zero-symmetric density function f(·) with support s̄j ≡ s(0, 0). That is,
the random variable X̄j ≡ Xj(0, 0) conforms to the situation with maximal confusion in source
j ∈ {1, 2}.47
For any mental state with (mj , Ij) ≥ (0, 0), Xj(mj , Ij) then is a symmetric truncation of X̄j .
Because any symmetric truncation of X̄j is fully described by its support, we identify Xj(mj , Ij)




any (mj , Ij) 6= (0, 0). Thus, a mental state with (m′j , I ′j) > (mj , Ij) has s′j < sj and thus
features less confusion from source j than state (mj , Ij).
The following proposition shows that if (m, I) is the current mental state of a household,
then an information intervention leading to (m′, I ′) ≥ (m, i) with (m′, I ′) 6= (m, i) reduces the
likelihood of making a decision mistake.48
Proposition 1 Let ∆p > ∆Q and π(m, i) ≡ Prob(ε(m, I) < ∆p∆Q−1) ∈ (1/2, 1) be the chance of
(correctly) choosing AC j = 2 given by (6). Then π(m′, I ′) > π(m, I) whenever (m′, I ′) ≥ (m, I)
and (m′, I ′) 6= (m, I), i.e., the likelihood of making a decision mistake due to misperception is
lowered under mental state (m′, I ′).
44For example, if attention is a fixed capability, better information about a source could imply that a household
can reshuffle its attention to other sources, e.g., due to solving an optimization problem as in the rational
inattention literature pioneered by Sims (2003), or because of salience effects Kaufmann et al. (2018).
45Note that interventions can, in principle, also have confusing effects, in particular if the interventions origi-
nate from firms seeking to sell certain products. Such a possibility of “intentional confusion” is analyzed by Hefti
et al. (2020) in the context of a strategic game.
46That is, we think of the fundamental statistical law determining the distribution of the mistakes fj(·) as an
intrinsic property of the human brain which as such is not affected by information or attention.
47Note that it suffices to define a base distribution X̄j relative to which all truncations of Xj are derived;
given X̄j the collection of symmetric truncations then are totally ordered.
48The proof can be found at the end of this section.
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B.3 Relation to our Information Treatments
We now explain our main hypotheses regarding the information interventions we conducted in
the empirical part of this study through the lens of the above model. In the control group,
no additional information was provided to households other than the one by the sellers of the
various AC’s. Let the mental state in the control group be given by (m, I). By contrast, we
provided the households with additional information in all three information treatments about
the usage cost difference ∆Q.
In the Pure Information treatment, we provided additional factual information about the
nominal cost difference ∆Q. This means that the households do not need to search for similar
figures, nor need they come up with similar calculations on their own. In terms of our model, we
interpret this as an informational improvement such that (m′, I ′) ≥ (m, I) with I ′ 6= I, which
predicts that the probability of making a decision mistake should deteriorate.
However, this information effect could be small if providing mere factual information does
not have a strong effect on the various sources of perception mistakes Xi. In particular, as
mentioned earlier, households still need to understand and work with large numbers, and relate
them to their needs, which may be a source of confusion in its own.
For this reason, transforming these numbers in something they know the value of from every-
day life, such as quantities of milk, might alleviate such a confusion. We therefore think of the
Milk Treatment as inducing an informational improvement (m′, I ′′) ≥ (m′, I ′) where I ′′i > I ′i
and i refers to “confusion from thinking in opportunity costs”. In terms of our model, the
“Milk” Treatment can outperform the “Pure Information” treatment if this source of confusion
is sufficiently relevant (i.e., the weighting factor αi is large).
Another concern we had is that households may not pay enough attention to the decision
problem, e.g., because they think of it as too complicated.49 One possible solution then is to
seek to involve people possibly in a playful manner into the thinking process. Our “Involvement
Treatment” asks the households to conduct the relevant calculations (in nominal terms) by
themselves, and provides them with an incentive to derive the correct results. The difference to
the Pure Information Treatment thus is that they obtain the same factual information in the
end, but are involved in the process of acquiring it rather than passively consuming it. In terms
of our model, we think of the Involvement Treatment as improving the attention allocated to
the decision problem while not altering information relative to the Pure Information treatment,
i.e., (m′′′, I ′) ≥ (m′, I ′) where (m′′′ 6= m′). That is, if the allocation of attention indeed is an
49Note that this is at odds with the idea of optimally allocating attention as discussed in Section B.4.
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important reason for deficient choices and our “Involvement Treatment” can stimulate attention,
then the Involvement Treatment should outperform the Pure Information Treatment.
Finally, we note that as all information treatments in the end provide households with the
same additional information about ∆Q, the decision quality in the pooled information treat-
ments should also outperform the one in the control group.
B.4 Optimal Attention
In this section, we apply our model to the case where attention (m1,m2) is allocated intentionally
by the decision-maker, as this special case has received substantial attention in economics.50
In this case, (m1,m2) is not a direct consequence from an information intervention, but may
be indirectly affected via the quality of information provided.We now illustrate that also in the
case where attention is allocated by means of optimization, providing better information has
the effect of reducing perception errors.
Let w > 0 and suppose that attention is a finite resource, such that always m1+,m2 ≤ m̄, and
attention is intentionally allocated by the human brain to maximize FεT (w), i.e., to minimize
the chance of a perception error. That is, for any given information state I = (I1, I2) the brain
chooses its attention (m∗1,m
∗
2) such as to maximize Fε(w) given the restriction thatm1+m2 ≤ m̄.
An exogenous improvement of the quality of information, at least with respect to one source i,
may then induce a reshuffling of attention, e.g., by focusing more on the source for which less
information is available.
Maintaining all assumptions previously made on how a given mental state (m, I) can affect
Fε(w), let Fε∗(w) < 1 denote the optimized chances of choosing correctly given that the current
information state is I. Consider a (marginal) increase in information, such that I ′ ≥ I and
I ′ 6= I. It then follows by a standard Envelope Theorem argument that any reshuffling of
attention triggered by such an informational improvement must reduce the optimal perception
error, i.e., Fε∗(w) strictly increases if I
′ ≥ I and I ′ 6= I.
With respect to our empirical hypotheses, we note that the Involvement Treatment would
most likely fail to have an additional effect on the decision quality relative to Pure Informa-
tion if attention is allocated optimally by the household: As the Involvement Treatment does




By contrast, the Milk Treatment may still lead to an improved decision quality because the
relevant information is directly accessible in opportunity costs, meaning that households do not
50See, e.g., Sims (2003); Caplin and Dean (2015).
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need mental resources to perform these calculations anymore.
Proof Proposition 1 As in the main text, let w ≡ ∆p∆Q − 1. We prove Proposition 1 by first
establishing the following result.
Lemma 1 Fix w > 0 and let Fε(w) ∈ (1/2, 1) be given by (6). Consider the aggregate perception
error εT = XT1 + X2, where for any given s
T
1 ∈ (0, s1), XT1 is the symmetric truncation of X1





< 0 on ∀sT1 ∈ (0, s1), and thus FεT (w) > Fε(w) for any
given ∀sT1 ∈ (0, s1).
Proof Lemma 1: Note that the CDF pertaining to XT1 is










F T1 (w + e)f2(e)de =
∫ ∞
−∞










< 0, implying that
FεT (w) is strictly decreasing in s
T
1 on (0, s1). It then follows immediately that FεT (w) > Fε(w)
as claimed by the Lemma.51






(1− 2F1(w + e)) f2(e)de < 0.
Evaluation of this integral gives∫ ∞
−∞
(1− 2F1(w + e)) f2(e)de = 1− 2
∫ ∞
−∞
F1(w + e)f2(e)de = 1− 2Fε(w) < 0,






Note that Lemma 1 equally applies if X2 is truncated to X
T
2 instead, or if both X1, X2 are
simultaneously truncated to XT1 , X
T
2 . We now prove Proposition 1. Because (m
′, I ′) ≥ (m, I)
and (m′, I ′) 6= (m, I) it must be the case that both attention and information have not been
reduced in any source, and attention or information have strictly increased at least in one









−j) ≤ s−j(m−j , I−j).
Let εT ≡ ε(m′, I ′) and ε ≡ ε(m, I). By Lemma 1 and the argument just given, FεT (w) <




2) ≤ (s1, s2) with (s′1, s′2) 6= (s1, s2). Therefore, we may conclude that
Fε(m′,I′)(w) > Fε(m,I)(w), or π(m
′, I ′) > π(m, I) as claimed. 
51By continuity, we have that Pr(ε < w) = Pr(ε ≤ w) = Fε(w).
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